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ON DEEP HOLES OF GENERALIZED PROJECTIVE
REED-SOLOMON CODES
XIAOFAN XU, SHAOFANG HONG, AND YONGCHAO XU
Abstract. Determining deep holes is an important topic in decoding Reed-Solomon
codes. Cheng and Murray, Li and Wan, Wu and Hong investigated the error distance
of generalized Reed-Solomon codes. Recently, Zhang and Wan explored the deep
holes of projective Reed-Solomon codes. Let l ≥ 1 be an integer and a1, . . . , al be
arbitrarily given l distinct elements of the finite field Fq of q elements with the odd
prime number p as its characteristic. Let D = Fq\{a1, . . . , al} and k be an integer
such that 2 ≤ k ≤ q− l−1. In this paper, we study the deep holes of generalized pro-
jective Reed-Solomon code GPRSq(D, k) of length q− l+1 and dimension k over Fq.
For any f(x) ∈ Fq[x], we let f(D) = (f(y1), . . . , f(yq−l)) if D = {y1, ..., yq−l} and
ck−1(f(x)) be the coefficient of x
k−1 of f(x). By using Du¨r’s theorem on the relation
between the covering radius and minimum distance of GPRSq(D, k), we show that
if u(x) ∈ Fq[x] with deg(u(x)) = k, then the received codeword (u(D), ck−1(u(x)))
is a deep hole of GPRSq(D, k) if and only if the sum
∑
y∈I
y is nonzero for any subset
I ⊆ D with #(I) = k. We show also that if j is an integer with 1 ≤ j ≤ l and
uj(x) := λj(x−aj)q−2+νjxk−1+f
(j)
≤k−2(x) with λj ∈ F
∗
q , νj ∈ Fq and f
(j)
≤k−2(x) ∈
Fq [x] being a polynomial of degree at most k − 2, then (uj(D), ck−1(uj(x))) is a
deep hole of GPRSq(D, k) if and only if the sum
(
q−2
k−1
)
(−aj)q−1−k
∏
y∈I
(aj − y) + e
is nonzero for any subset I ⊆ D with #(I) = k, where e is the identity of the group
F
∗
q . This implies that (uj(D), ck−1(uj(x))) is a deep hole of GPRSq(D, k) if p|k. We
also deduce that (u(F∗q ), δ) is a deep hole of the primitive projective Reed-Solomon
code PPRSq(F∗q , k) if u(x) = λx
q−2 + δxk−1 + f≤k−2(x) with λ ∈ F
∗
q and δ ∈ Fq.
But (u(F∗q), ck−1(u(x))) is not a deep hole of PPRSq(F
∗
q , k) if deg(u(x)) = k.
1. Introduction and the statements of the main results
Let Fq be the finite field of q elements with p as its characteristic. Let n and k be
positive integers such that k < n. Let D = {x1, · · · , xn} be a subset of Fq, which is
called the evaluation set. The generalized Reed-Solomon code GRSq(D, k) of length n
and dimension k over Fq is defined by:
GRSq(D, k) := {(f(x1), . . . , f(xn)) ∈ Fnq | f(x) ∈ Fq[x], deg f(x) ≤ k − 1}.
Moreover, the generalized projective Reed-Solomon code GPRSq(D, k) of length n+1 and
dimension k over Fq is defined as follows:
GPRSq(D, k) := {(f(x1), . . . , f(xn), ck−1(f(x))) ∈ Fn+1q | f(x) ∈ Fq[x], deg f(x) ≤ k − 1},
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where ck−1(f(x)) is the coefficient of x
k−1 of f(x). If D = F∗q , then it is called primitive
projective Reed-Solomon code, namely,
PPRSq(F
∗
q , k) := {(f(1), . . . , f(αq−2), ck−1(f(x))) ∈ Fqq | f(x) ∈ Fq[x], deg f(x) ≤ k − 1},
where α is a primitive element of Fq. If D = Fq, then it is called the extended projective
Reed Solomon code. For u = (u1, . . . , un) ∈ Fnq , v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Fnq , the Hamming
distance d(u, v) is defined by
d(u, v) := #{1 ≤ i ≤ n | ui 6= vi, ui ∈ Fq, vi ∈ Fq}.
For any [n, k]q linear code C, the minimum distance d(C) is defined by
d(C) := min{d(x, y) | x ∈ C, y ∈ C, x 6= y},
where d(·, ·) denotes the Hamming distance of two words. A linear [n, k, d] code is called
maximum distance separable (MDS) code if d = n− k+ 1. The error distance to code C
of a received word u ∈ Fnq is defined by
d(u,C) := min
v∈C
{d(u, v)}.
Clearly, d(u,C) = 0 if and only if u ∈ C. The covering radius to code C of a received
word u ∈ Fnq is defined by
ρ(C) := max{d(u,C) | u ∈ Fnq }.
The most important algorithmic problem in coding theory is the maximum likelihood
decoding (MLD): Given a received word u ∈ Fnq , find a word v ∈ C such that d(u, v) =
d(u,C), then we decode u to v [7]. Therefore, it is very crucial to decide d(u,C) for the
word u. Guruswami and Sudan [3] provided a polynomial time list decoding algorithm
for the decoding of u when d(u,C) ≤ n−
√
nk. When the error distance increases,
Guruswami and Vardy [4] showed that that maximum-likelihood decoding is NP-hard
for the family of Reed-Solomon codes. We also notice that Du¨r [2] studied the Cauchy
codes. In particular, Du¨r [2] got the relation between the covering radius and minimum
distance of GPRSq(D, k). When decoding the generalized projective Reed-Solomon code
C,for a received word u = (u1, . . . , un, un+1) ∈ Fn+1q , we define the Lagrange interpolation
polynomial u(x) of u by
u(x) :=
n∑
i=1
ui
n∏
j=1
j 6=i
x− xj
xi − xj ∈ Fq[x],
i.e., u(x) is the unique polynomial of degree deg u(x) ≤ n − 1 such that u(xi) = ui for
1 ≤ i ≤ n and ck−1(u(x)) = un+1. It is clear that u ∈ C if and only if d(u,C) = 0 if
and only if deg u(x) ≤ k − 1. Equivalently, u 6∈ C if and only if d(u,C) ≥ 1 if and only if
k ≤ deg u(x) ≤ n−1. Evidently, we have the following simple bounds of d(u,GRSq(D, k))
which are due to Li and Wan.
Theorem 1.1. [6] Let u be a received word such that u 6∈ GRSq(D, k). Then
n− deg u(x) ≤ d(u,GRSq(D, k)) ≤ n− k = ρ(GRSq(D, k)).
Let u ∈ Fnq . If d(u,GRSq(D, k)) = ρ(GRSq(D, k)), then the received word u is called
a deep hole of GRSq(D, k). In 2007, Cheng and Murray [1] conjectured that a word u
is a deep hole of GRSq(Fq, k) if and only if u(x) = ax
k + f≤k−1(x), where u(x) is the
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Lagrange interpolation polynomial of the received word u and a ∈ F∗q , f≤k−1(x) ∈ Fq[x] a
polynomial of degree at most k− 1. In 2012, Wu and Hong [9] disproved this conjecture
by giving a new class of deep holes for Reed-Solomon codes GRSq(F
∗
q , k). In fact, if
q ≥ 4 and 2 ≤ k ≤ q − 2, then they showed that the received word u is a deep hole
if its Lagrange interpolation polynomial is axq−2 + f≤k−1(x). In [5], Hong and Wu
proved that the received word u is a deep hole of the generalized Reed-Solomon codes
GRSq(D, k) if its Lagrange interpolation polynomial is λ(x − ai)q−2 + f≤k−1(x), where
λ ∈ F∗q , ai ∈ Fq\D and f≤k−1(x) ∈ Fq[x] a polynomial of degree at most k − 1.
Throughout this paper, we always let l be a positive integer and a1, . . . , al be any
fixed l distinct elements of Fq. Let
D := Fq\{a1, . . . , al}.
We write
D := {y1, . . . , yq−l},
and for any f(x) ∈ Fq[x], we let
f(D) := (f(y1), . . . , f(yq−l)),
and use ck−1(f(x)) to denote the coefficient of x
k−1 of f(x). Then we can rewrite the
generalized projective Reed-Solomon code GPRS(D, k) with evaluation set D as
GPRSq(D, k) := {(f(D), ck−1(f(x))) ∈ Fq−l+1q | f(x) ∈ Fq[x], deg f(x) ≤ k − 1}.
Let u /∈ GPRSq(D, k). If d(u,GPRSq(D, k)) = ρ(GPRSq(D, k)), then u is also called
a deep hole of generalized projective Reed-Solomon code GPRSq(D, k). In 2016, Zhang
and Wan [10] studied the deep holes of projective Reed-Solomon code GPRS(Fq, k). In
fact, under the assumption that the only deep holes of GRSq(Fq, k) are those received
codewords whose Lagrange interpolation polynomials are of degree k, they proved the
following results by solving a subset sum problem.
Theorem 1.2. [10] Let q be an odd prime power. Assume that 3 ≤ k + 1 ≤ p or
3 ≤ q − p + 1 ≤ k + 1 ≤ q − 2. Then the received codeword (f(Fq), ck−1(f(x))) with
deg f(x) = k is a deep hole of GPRS(Fq, k).
Theorem 1.3. [10] Let deg f(x) ≥ k + 1 and s := deg f(x) − k + 1. If there are
positive constants c1 and c2 such that s < c1
√
q, ( s2 + 2) log2(q) < k < c2q, then
(f(Fq), ck−1(f(x))) is not a deep hole of GPRS(Fq, k).
In this paper, our main goal is to investigate the deep holes of the generalized projec-
tive Reed-Solomon codes GPRSq(D, k). Actually, we will present characterizations for
the received codewords of degrees k and q − 2 to be deep holes of generalized projective
Reed-Solomon code GPRSq(D, k). The main results of this paper can be stated as follows.
Theorem 1.4. Let q be a prime power and k and l be positive integers such that q ≥ 5
and 2 ≤ k ≤ min(q − 3, q − l − 1). Let u(x) ∈ Fq[x] with deg(u(x)) = k. Then the
received codeword (u(D), ck−1(u(x))) is a deep hole of the generalized projective Reed-
Solomon code GPRSq(D, k) if and only if the sum
∑
y∈I
y is nonzero for any subset I ⊆ D
with #(I) = k.
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Theorem 1.5. Let q be a prime power and k and l be positive integers such that q ≥ 4
and 2 ≤ k ≤ q − l − 1. Let j be an integer with 1 ≤ j ≤ l and let uj(x) := λj(x−aj)q−2+
νjx
k−1 + f
(j)
≤k−2(x) with λj ∈ F∗q , νj ∈ Fq and f (j)≤k−2(x) ∈ Fq[x] being a polynomial of
degree at most k − 2. Then the received codeword (uj(D), ck−1(uj(x))) is a deep hole
of the generalized projective Reed-Solomon code GPRSq(D, k) if and only if the sum(
q−2
k−1
)
aq−1−kj
∏
y∈I
(y − aj) + e is nonzero for any subset I ⊆ D with #(I) = k, where e is
the identity of the multiplicative group F∗q.
Further, if k ≡ 0 (mod p), then the received codeword (uj(D), ck−1(uj(x))) is a deep
hole of GPRSq(D, k).
From Theorems 1.4 and 1.5, we can derive the following results on the deep holes of
the primitive projective Reed-Solomon codes. Note that the proof of Theorem 1.6 relies
also on a result on the zero subsets sum of the group F∗q (see Lemma 2.8 below).
Theorem 1.6. Let q be an odd prime power such that q ≥ 5 and 2 ≤ k ≤ q − 3. If
u(x) = λxk + γxk−1 + f≤k−2(x) with λ ∈ F∗q , γ ∈ Fq and f≤k−2(x) ∈ Fq[x] being a
polynomial of degree at most k − 2, then the received codeword (u(F∗q), γ) is not a deep
hole of the primitive projective Reed-Solomon code PPRSq(F
∗
q , k).
Theorem 1.7. Let q ≥ 4 and 2 ≤ k ≤ q − 2. If u(x) = λxq−2 + δxk−1 + f≤k−2(x) with
λ ∈ F∗q , δ ∈ Fq and f≤k−2(x) ∈ Fq[x] being a polynomial of degree at most k − 2, then
the received codeword (u(F∗q), δ) is a deep hole of the primitive projective Reed-Solomon
code PPRSq(F
∗
q , k).
In the proofs of Theorems 1.4 and 1.5, the basic tools are the MDS code and Van-
demonde determinant. But we would also like to point out that a key ingredient in
the proofs is Du¨r’s theorem on the relation between the covering radius and minimum
distance of the generalized projective Reed-Solomon code GPRSq(D, k) (see Lemma 2.6
below). Another important ingredient is a new result on the zero-sum problem in the
finite field that we will prove in the next section.
This paper is organized as follows. First of all, in Section 2, we recall and prove several
preliminary lemmas that are needed in the proof of Theorems 1.4 and 1.5. Consequently,
in Section 3, we use the lemmas presented in Section 2 to give the proofs of Theorems
1.4 and 1.6. Finally, by using the results given in Section 2, we supply in Section 4 the
proofs of Theorems 1.5 and 1.7.
2. Preliminary lemmas
In this section, our main aim is to prove several lemmas that are needed in the proof
of Theorems 1.4 and 1.5. We begin with the following result on MDS codes.
Lemma 2.1. Let C be a MDS code and u0 ∈ C be a given codeword. Then the received
codeword u is a deep hole of C if and only if the received codeword u+ u0 is a deep hole
of C.
Proof. First of all, let u be a received codeword. Then by the definition of deep hole,
one knows that u is a deep hole of C if and only if d(u,C) = ρ(C) with ρ(C) being the
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covering radius of C, if and only if
min
v∈C
{d(u, v)} = ρ(C). (2.1)
Likewise, one has that the received codeword u+ u0 is a deep hole of C if and only if
min
v∈C
{d(u+ u0, v)} = ρ(C). (2.2)
Since
{d(u+ u0, v)|v ∈ C} = {d(u+ u0, v + u0)|v ∈ C},
it follows that
min
v∈C
{d(u+ u0, v)} = min
v∈C
{d(u+ u0, v + u0)}. (2.3)
But d(u + u0, v + u0) = d(u, v) for any codeword u0. Hence (2.3) tells us that
min
v∈C
{d(u+ u0, v)} = min
v∈C
{d(u, v)}. (2.4)
Now from (2.1), (2.2) and (2.4), one can deduce that u is a deep hole of C if and only
if u+ u0 is a deep hole of C as one desires. So Lemma 2.1 is proved. ✷
Remark 2.1. We should point out that if the codeword u0 is not in C, then Lemma
2.1 is not true.
In what follows, we let
Pk−1 := {f(x) | f(x) ∈ Fq[x], deg f(x) ≤ k − 1}.
We have the following result.
Lemma 2.2. Let #(D) = q− l and let u ∈ Fq−l+1q and v ∈ Fq−l+1q be two codewords with
u(x) and v(x) being the Lagrange polynomials of u and v. If u(x) = λv(x) + f≤k−2(x),
where λ ∈ F∗q and f≤k−2(x) ∈ Fq[x] is a polynomial of degree at most k − 2, then
d(u,GPRSq(D, k)) = d(v,GPRSq(D, k)).
Further, u is a deep hole of GPRSq(D, k) if and only if v is a deep hole of GPRSq(D, k).
Proof. Since u(x) = λv(x) + f≤k−2(x), we have u(D) = λv(D) + f≤k−2(D) and
ck−1(u(x)) = λck−1(v(x)). By the definition of Hamming distance, we know that for any
code C over Fq, if u and v are codewords of C, then
d(u, v) = d(u+ w, v + w) = d(λu, λv)
hold for any codeword w of C and any λ ∈ F∗q . Then from the definition of error distance
and noticing that u = (u(D), ck−1(u(x))), we can deduce immediately that
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d(u,GPRSq(D, k))
= min
g∈Pk−1
d(u, (g(D), ck−1(g(x))))
= min
g∈Pk−1
d((u(D), ck−1(u(x))), (g(D), ck−1(g(x))))
= min
g∈Pk−1
d((λv(D) + f≤k−2(D), ck−1(u(x))), (g(D), ck−1(g(x))))
= min
g∈Pk−1
d((λv(D) + f≤k−2(D), λck−1(v(x))), (g(D), ck−1(g(x))))
= min
g∈Pk−1
d((λv(D) + f≤k−2(D), λck−1(v(x))), (g(D) + f≤k−2(D), ck−1(g(x))))
= min
g∈Pk−1
d((λv(D), λck−1(v(x))), (g(D), ck−1(g(x))))
= min
g∈Pk−1
d((λv(D), λck−1(v(x))), (λg(D), λck−1(g(x))))(since λ ∈ F∗q)
= min
g∈Pk−1
d((v(D), ck−1(v(x))), (g(D), ck−1(g(x))))
=d((v(D), ck−1(v(x))),GPRSq(D, k))
=d(v,GPRSq(D, k))
as required. The proof of Lemma 2.2 is complete. ✷
For a linear [n, k] code C with n and k being the length and dimension of C, re-
spectively, we define the generator matrix, denoted by G, to be the k × n matrix of the
form G := (g1, . . . , gk)
T , where {g1, . . . , gk} is a basis of C as a vector space. Since
D = {y1, . . . , yq−l}, the following k × (q − l + 1) matrix

1(D) ck−1(1)
x(D) ck−1(x)
...
...
xk−2(D) ck−1(x
k−2)
xk−1(D) ck−1(x
k−1)

 =


1 . . . 1 0
y1 . . . yq−l 0
...
...
...
...
yk−21 . . . y
k−2
q−l 0
yk−11 . . . y
k−1
q−l 1

 (2.5)
forms a generator matrix of GPRSq(D, k). For the purpose of this paper, we will choose
the above matrix as the generator matrix of GPRSq(D, k).
Lemma 2.3. [8] Let C be an [n, k] linear code and G be the generator matrix of C. Then
C is a MDS code if and only if any k distinct columns of G are linear independent over
finite field Fq.
Throughout this paper, for any nonempty set {γ1, . . . , γn} ⊂ Fq, we define the Van-
dermonde determinant, denoted by V (γ1, . . . , γn), as follows:
V (γ1, . . . , γn) := det


1 . . . 1
γ1 . . . γn
...
...
...
γn−11 . . . γ
n−1
n

 .
We have the following well-known result.
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Lemma 2.4. [8] One has
V (γ1, . . . , γn) =
∏
1≤i<j≤n
(γj − γi).
In the following, we show that the generalized projective Reed-Solomon code is a MDS
code.
Lemma 2.5. Let D ⊂ Fq. Then GPRSq(D, k) is a [q − l + 1, k] MDS code over finite
field Fq.
Proof. Let G be the generator matrix of GPRSq(D, k) given in (2.5). Write G :=
(G1, . . . , Gq−l+1). Let i1, . . . , ik be arbitrary k distinct integers such that 1 ≤ i1 < · · · <
ik ≤ q− l+1. We claim that det(Gi1 , . . . , Gik) 6= 0 which will be proved in what follows.
If ik ≤ q − l, then it follows that
det(Gi1 , . . . , Gik) = V (yi1 , . . . , yik) =
∏
1≤t<s≤k
(yis − yit) 6= 0.
The claim is true in this case.
If ik = q− l+1, then by expanding the determinant according to the last column, we
arrive at
det(Gi1 , . . . , Gik) = V (yi1 , . . . , yik−1) =
∏
1≤t<s≤k−1
(yis − yit) 6= 0.
The claim is proved in this case.
Now by the claim, we can derive that any k columns of the generator matrix G is
linear independent. Then GPRSq(D, k) is a MDS code by Lemma 2.3.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 2.5. ✷
The following result about the relation between the covering radius and minimum
distance of GPRSq(D, k) will play a key role in this paper which is due to Du¨r [2].
Lemma 2.6. [2] Let D be a proper subset of Fq. Then
ρ(GPRSq(D, k)) = d(GPRSq(D, k))− 1.
The following result is well known.
Lemma 2.7. [11] Let G be a generator matrix of a MDS code C = [n, k] over the finite
field Fq. If the covering radius ρ(C) = n− k, then a received codeword u ∈ Fnq is a deep
hole of C if and only if the (k + 1) × n matrix
(
G
u
)
can be served as the generator
matrix of another MDS code.
In what follows, we show a result on the zero-sum problem in the finite field of odd
characteristic.
Lemma 2.8. Let q = ps with p being an odd prime number and k be an integer with
2 ≤ k ≤ q − 3. Then there exist a subset I ⊆ F∗q with #(I) = k such that
∑
z∈I
z = 0.
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Proof. Since p is an odd prime number, it follows that for any z ∈ F∗q , one has −z ∈ F∗q
and z 6= −z since 2z 6= 0. But |F∗q \ {z,−z}| = q − 3 ≥ 2 since q ≥ k + 3 ≥ 5. Now one
can pick z′ ∈ F∗q \ {z,−z}. Then −z′ ∈ F∗q \ {z,−z, z′} since 2z′ 6= 0. Continuing in this
way, we finally arrive at
F∗q = {z1,−z1, · · · , z q−1
2
,−z q−1
2
}. (2.6)
We consider the following cases.
Case 1. 2 | k. In this case, we let I = {z1,−z1, · · · , z k
2
,−z k
2
}. Then I ⊂ F∗q and we
have ∑
z∈I
z =
k
2∑
i=1
(zi + (−zi)) = 0
as desired. Lemma 2.8 holds if 2 | k.
Case 2. 2 ∤ k. Then k ≥ 3 and so q ≥ 7 since 2 ≤ k ≤ q − 3. We claim that there are
three distinct elements z′, z′′, z′′′ ∈ F∗q such that z′ + z′′ + z′′′ = 0, which will be proved
by dividing into the following three subcases.
Case 2.1. p = 3. We pick a z′ ∈ F∗q . Then 3z′ = 0, −z′ 6= 0 and 2z′ 6= 0. The
latter implies that z′ 6= −z′. Since p = 3 and q ≥ 7, we deduce that q ≥ 32 = 9. Thus
|F∗q \ {z′,−z′}| = q− 3 ≥ 6. So we can choose a z′′ ∈ F∗q \ {z′,−z′}. But 2z′′ 6= 0. Hence
−z′′ ∈ F∗q \ {z′,−z′, z′′}. It implies that z′+ z′′ 6= 0, namely, z′+ z′′ ∈ F∗q . Furthermore,
we have that z′+z′′ is not equal to anyone of the four elements z′,−z′, z′′ and −z′′. That
is, z′ + z′′ ∈ F∗q \ {z′,−z′, z′′,−z′′}. Hence −(z′ + z′′) ∈ F∗q \ {z′,−z′, z′′,−z′′, z′ + z′′}.
Therefore there are three distinct elements z′, z′′ and −(z′ + z′′) in F∗q such that their
sum equals zero. The claim holds in this case.
Case 2.2. p = 5. Take a z′ ∈ F∗q . Then 5z′ = 0 and none of z′, 2z′, 3z′ and 4z′ equals
zero. It follows that the four elements z′,−z′, 2z′,−2z′ are pairwise distinct. Since
q ≥ 7 > 5, one must have q ≥ 52 = 25. Thus |F∗q \ {z′,−z′, 2z′,−2z′}| = q − 5 ≥ 20.
So we can choose z′′ ∈ F∗q \ {z′,−z′, 2z′,−2z′}. Then −z′′ ∈ F∗q \ {z′,−z′, 2z′,−2z′} and
z′ + z′′ 6= 0. The latter one tells us that −(z′ + z′′) ∈ F∗q . Obviously, −z′′ 6= z′′ since
2z′′ 6= 0. Hence −z′′ ∈ F∗q \ {z′,−z′, 2z′,−2z′, z′′}.
Furthermore, we can deduce that z′ + z′′ is not equal to any of z′,−z′, 2z′,−2z′, z′′
and −z′′. This infers that −(z′ + z′′) ∈ F∗q \ {z′,−z′, 2z′,−2z′, z′′,−z′′, z′ + z′′} since
2(z′+ z′′) 6= 0. Therefore we can find three distinct elements z′, z′′ and −(z′+ z′′) in F∗q
such that their sum equals zero. The claim holds in this case. The claim is proved in
this case.
Case 2.3. p ≥ 7. Then le 6= 0 for any integer l with 1 ≤ l ≤ 6, where e stands for the
identity of the group F∗q . Since e 6= 0, 4e 6= 0 and 5e 6= 0, we have e 6= 2e, e 6= −3e and
2e 6= −3e. So there are three different elements e, 2e,−3e in F∗q such that their sum is
equal to zero as one desires. The claim is true in this case.
Now by the claim, we know that there are three integers i1, i2 and i3 such that 1 ≤
i1 < i2 < i3 ≤ q−12 and zi1 + zi2 + zi3 = 0.
If q = 7, then letting I = {zi1 , zi2 , zi3} gives us the desired result.
If q > 7, then F∗q \ {±zi1 ,±zi2 ,±zi3} is nonempty. By (2.6), we obtain that
F∗q \ {±zi1 ,±zi2 ,±zi3}
={±z1, ...,±zi1−1,±zi1+1, ...,±zi2−1,±zi2+1, ...,±zi3−1,±zi3+1, ...,±z q−1
2
}. (2.7)
Since 2 ∤ k, k− 3 is even. Evidently, the sum of the first k− 3 elements on the right hand
side of (2.7) is equal to zero because zi + (−zi) = 0 for all integers 1 ≤ i ≤ q−12 . Then
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the first k − 3 elements on the right hand side of (2.7) together with the three elements
zi1 , zi2 , zi3 gives us the desired result. Thus Lemma 2.8 is true if 2 ∤ k.
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.8. ✷
For any positive integer x, we define its p-adic valuation, denoted by vp(x), to be the
largest exponent r such that pr divides x. In the conclusion of this section, We provide
the following characterization on the divisibility of certain binomial coefficients by the
prime number p.
Lemma 2.9. Let q be a power of the odd prime p and let t be an integer with 2 ≤ t ≤ q−1.
Then vp
((
q−2
t−1
))
= vp(t). Consequently, the binomial coefficient
(
q−2
t−1
)
is divisible by p if
and only if t is a multiple of p.
Proof. Clearly, one has (
q − 2
t− 1
)
= (q − t)
t−1∏
i=2
q − i
i
.
Therefore
vp(
(
q − 2
t− 1
)
) =
t−1∑
i=2
vp(
q − i
i
) + vp(q − t)
=
t−1∑
i=2
(vp(q − i)− vp(i)) + vp(q − t). (2.8)
Since q is a power of p, it follows that for any positive integer i with i < q, one has
vp(i) < vp(q), and so
vp(q − i) = vp(i). (2.9)
Then from (2.8) and (2.9) one derives that
vp(
(
q − 2
t− 1
)
) = vp(q − t) = vp(t)
as required. It then follows that p | (q−2
t−1
)
if and only if p | t. So Lemma 2.9 is proved. ✷
3. Proofs of Theorems 1.4 and 1.6
In this section, we use the lemmas presented in the previous to give the proofs of
Theorems 1.4 and 1.6. At first, we show Theorem 1.4.
Proof of Theorem 1.4. Since deg(u(x)) = k, one may let u(x) = λxk + νxk−1 +
f≤k−2(x) with λ ∈ F∗q , ν ∈ Fq and f≤k−2(x) ∈ Fq[x] being a polynomial of degree at
most k−2. Then (u(D), ck−1(u(x))) = (u(D), ν). By Lemma 2.2, we have that (u(D), ν)
is a deep hole of the generalized projective Reed-Solomon code GPRSq(D, k) if and only
if (λ−1u(D), λ−1ν) is a deep hole of GPRSq(D, k). But
λ−1u(x) = wk(x) + rk(x),
where wk(x) := x
k and
rk(x) := λ
−1νxk−1 + λ−1f≤k−2(x).
Then one has
(λ−1u(D), λ−1ν) = (wk(D) + rk(D), λ
−1ν) = (wk(D), 0) + (rk(D), λ
−1ν).
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Since deg rk(x) ≤ k − 1, by the definition of GPRSq(D, k) we have (rk(D), λ−1ν) ∈
GPRSq(D, k). Then it follows from Lemma 2.1 that (λ
−1u(D), λ−1ν) is a deep hole of
GPRSq(D, k) if and only if (wk(D), 0) is a deep hole of GPRSq(D, k). Then we can
deduce that (u(D), ck−1(u(x))) is a deep hole of GPRSq(D, k) if and only if (wk(D), 0)
is a deep hole of GPRSq(D, k).
We denote w¯k := (wk(D), 0). Let G be the generator matrix of GPRSq(D, k) as given
in (2.5). Then we have
(
G
w¯k
)
=


1 . . . 1 0
y1 . . . yq−l 0
...
...
...
...
yk−21 . . . y
k−2
q−l 0
yk−11 . . . y
k−1
q−l 1
yk1 . . . y
k
q−l 0


:=(G¯1, . . . , G¯q−l, G¯q−l+1).
Now we pick k + 1 distinct integers with 1 ≤ j1 < · · · < jk+1 ≤ q − l + 1.
Case 1. jk+1 ≤ q − l. Then one has
det(G¯j1 , . . . , G¯jk+1) =det


1 . . . 1
yj1 . . . yjk+1
...
...
...
yk−1j1 . . . y
k−1
jk+1
ykj1 . . . y
k
jk+1


=V (yj1 , . . . , yjk+1)
=
∏
1≤t<s≤k+1
(yjs − yjt) 6= 0.
Case 2. jk+1 = q − l + 1. We can compute and get that
det(G¯j1 , . . . , G¯jk , G¯jq−l+1 ) = det


1 . . . 1 0
yj1 · · · yjk 0
...
...
...
...
yk−2j1 . . . y
k−2
jk
0
yk−1j1 . . . y
k−1
jk
1
yk1 . . . y
k
jk
0


=− det


1 . . . 1
yj1 · · · yjk
...
...
...
yk−2j1 . . . y
k−2
jk
ykj1 . . . y
k
jk

 . (3.1)
Now we introduce an auxiliary polynomial g(y) as follows:
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g(y) = det


1 . . . 1 1
yj1 · · · yjk y
...
...
...
...
yk−1j1 . . . y
k−1
jk
yk−1
ykj1 . . . y
k
jk
yk

 .
Then Lemma 2.4 tells us that
g(y) =
( ∏
1≤s<t≤k
(yjt − yjs)
) k∏
i=1
(y − yji) :=
k∑
i=0
aiy
i.
It infers that
ak−1 = −
( k∑
i=1
yji
) ∏
1≤s<t≤k
(yjt − yjs). (3.2)
But
ak−1 = − det


1 . . . 1
yj1 · · · yjk
...
...
...
yk−2j1 . . . y
k−2
jk
ykj1 . . . y
k
jk

 . (3.3)
Finally, (3.1) together with (3.2) and (3.3) gives us that
det(G¯j1 , . . . , G¯jk , G¯jq−l+1 ) = −
( k∑
i=1
yji
) ∏
1≤s<t≤k
(yjt − yjs). (3.4)
By Lemma 2.5, we know that GPRSq(D, k) is a [q− l+1, k] MDS code which implies
that
d(GPRSq(D, k)) = q − l + 1− k + 1 = q − l − k + 2.
Then by Lemma 2.6, one can deduce that
ρ(GPRSq(D, k)) =d(GPRSq(D, k))− 1 (3.5)
=q − l − k + 2− 1
=q − l + 1− k.
It then follows immediately from Lemma 2.7 that w¯k = (wk(D), 0) is a deep hole of
the generalized projective Reed-Solomon code GPRSq(D, k) if and only if the (k + 1)×
(q − l + 1) matrix
(
G
w¯k
)
can be served as the generator matrix of a MDS code, if
and only if any k + 1 columns of
(
G
w¯k
)
are linear independent, if and only if for any
1 ≤ j1 < · · · < jk+1 ≤ q − l + 1, one has
det(G¯j1 , . . . , G¯jk+1) 6= 0. (3.6)
By the discussion in Cases 1 and 2, (3.4) tells us that (3.6) holds if and only if for any
1 ≤ j1 < · · · < jk ≤ q − l, one has
k∑
i=1
yji 6= 0. Hence we can derive that (wk(D), 0) is
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a deep hole of the generalized projective Reed-Solomon code GPRSq(D, k) if and only if
the sum
∑
y∈I
y is nonzero for any subset I ⊆ D with #(I) = k as desired.
Finally, we can conclude that (u(D), ck−1(u(x))) is a deep hole of the generalized
projective Reed-Solomon code GPRSq(D, k) if and only if the sum
∑
y∈I
y is nonzero for
any subset I ⊆ D with #(I) = k.
This finishes the proof of Theorem 1.4. ✷
We can now use Theorem 1.4 to show Theorem 1.6.
Proof of Theorem 1.6. Let l = 1 and a1 = 0. ThenD = F
∗
q . By Lemma 2.8, there exist
a subset I ⊆ F∗q with #(I) = k such that
∑
y∈I
y = 0. It then follows from Theorem 1.4
that the received word (u(F∗q), ck−1(u(x)))=(u(F
∗
q), γ) is not a deep hole of the primitive
projective Reed-Solomon code PPRSq(F
∗
q , k). Therefore Theorem 1.6 is proved. ✷
4. Proofs of Theorems 1.5 and 1.7
In this section, we give the proof of Theorems 1.5 and 1.7. We begin with the proof
of Theorem 1.5.
Proof of Theorem 1.5. First of all, we note that j is an integer with 1 ≤ j ≤ l. We
introduce a polynomial fj(x) as follows:
fj(x) = (x− aj)q−2,
and define a codeword f¯j associated to fj(x) by
f¯j := (fj(D), ck−1(fj(x))).
Then uj(x) = λjfj(x) + νjx
k−1 + f
(j)
≤k−2(x) which implies that
ck−1(uj(x)) = λjck−1(fj(x)) + νj . (4.1)
It follows from (4.1) that
(uj(D), ck−1(uj(x)))
=(λjfj(D) + νjx
k−1(D) + f
(j)
≤k−2(D), λjck−1(fj(x)) + νj)
=(λjfj(D), λjck−1(fj(x))) + (νjx
k−1(D) + f
(j)
≤k−2(D), νj)
=λj f¯j + (νjx
k−1(D) + f
(j)
≤k−2(D), νj).
But
deg(νjx
k−1(x) + f
(j)
≤k−2(x)) ≤ k − 1
and
ck−1(νjx
k−1(x) + f
(j)
≤k−2(x)) = νj .
Hence
(νjx
k−1(D) + f
(j)
≤k−2(D), νj) ∈ GPRSq(D, k).
It follows from Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 that the received word (uj(D), ck−1(uj(x))) is a deep
hole of the generalized projective Reed-Solomon code GPRSq(D, k) if and only if f¯j is a
deep hole of GPRSq(D, k).
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Let G be the generator matrix of GPRSq(D, k) as given in (2.5). Since yi 6= aj for all
integers i with 1 ≤ i ≤ q − l, we have (yi − aj)q−2 = (yi − aj)−1. It then follows that
(
G
f¯j
)
=


1 . . . 1 0
y1 . . . yq−l 0
...
...
...
...
yk−21 . . . y
k−2
q−l 0
yk−11 . . . y
k−1
q−l 1
(y1 − aj)−1 . . . (yq−l − aj)−1 ck−1(fj)


(4.2)
:=(Gˆ1, . . . , Gˆq−l+1).
On the other hand, from Lemma 2.7 we can deduce that f¯j = (fj(D), ck−1(fj(x))) is
a deep hole of the generalized projective Reed-Solomon code GPRSq(D, k), if and only
if
(
G
f¯j
)
generates a MDS code, by Lemma 2.3, if and only if any k + 1 columns of(
G
f¯j
)
are linear independent, if and only if for all k + 1 integers j1, . . . , jk+1 with
1 ≤ j1 < · · · < jk+1 ≤ q − l + 1, one has
det(Gˆj1 , . . . , Gˆjk+1) 6= 0. (4.3)
In what follows, we choose arbitrarily k + 1 integers j1, . . . , jk+1 such that 1 ≤ j1 <
· · · < jk+1 ≤ q − l + 1. Consider the following two cases.
Case 1. jk+1 6= q − l + 1. Then k + 1 ≤ jk+1 ≤ q − l and by (4.2), one has
(Gˆj1 , . . . , Gˆjk+1) =


1 . . . 1
yj1 . . . yjk+1
...
...
...
yk−1j1 . . . y
k−1
jk+1
(yj1 − aj)−1 . . . (yjk+1 − aj)−1

 .
Thus one can deduce that
det(Gˆj1 , . . . , Gˆjk+1)
=
(
k+1∏
i=1
(yji − aj)−1
)
det


yj1 − aj . . . yjk+1 − aj
yj1(yj1 − aj) . . . yjk+1(yjk+1 − aj)
...
...
...
yk−1j1 (yj1 − aj) . . . yk−1jk+1(yjk+1 − aj)
1 . . . 1


=
(
k+1∏
i=1
(yji − aj)−1
)
det


yj1 . . . yjk+1
...
...
...
ykj1 . . . y
k
jk+1
1 . . . 1


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=(−1)k
(
k+1∏
i=1
(yji − aj)−1
)
V (yj1 , . . . , yjk+1)
=(−1)k
(
k+1∏
i=1
(yji − aj)−1
) ∏
1≤s<t≤k+1
(yjt − yjs) 6= 0
since yj1 , . . . , yjk+1 are pairwise distinct.
Case 2. jk+1 = q− l+1. Then 1 ≤ j1 < · · · < jk ≤ q− l. From (4.2) and Lemma 2.4,
we can deduce that
det(Gˆj1 , . . . , Gˆjk , Gˆjq−l+1)
=det


1 . . . 1 0
yj1 · · · yjk 0
...
...
...
...
yk−2j1 . . . y
k−2
jk
0
yk−1j1 . . . y
k−1
jk
1
(yj1 − aj)−1 . . . (yjk − aj)−1 ck−1(fj(x))


=ck−1(fj(x)) det


1 . . . 1
yj1 · · · yjk
...
...
...
yk−1j1 . . . y
k−1
jk

− det


1 . . . 1
yj1 · · · yjk
...
...
...
yk−2j1 . . . y
k−2
jk
(yj1 − aj)−1 . . . (yjk − aj)−1


=ck−1(fj(x))V (yj1 , . . . , yjk)− det


1 . . . 1
yj1 · · · yjk
...
...
...
yk−2j1 . . . y
k−2
jk
(yj1 − aj)−1 . . . (yjk − aj)−1


=ck−1(fj(x))V (yj1 , . . . , yjk)−
(
k∏
i=1
(yji − aj)−1
)
det


yj1 . . . yjk
...
...
...
yk−1j1 . . . y
k−1
jk
1 . . . 1


=ck−1(fj(x))V (yj1 , . . . , yjk) + (−1)k
(
k∏
i=1
(yji − aj)−1
)
V (yj1 , . . . , yjk)
=
(
ck−1(fj(x)) + (−1)k
k∏
i=1
(yji − aj)−1)
) ∏
1≤s<t≤k
(yjt − yjs)
=
(
ck−1(fj(x)) +
k∏
i=1
(aj − yji)−1)
) ∏
1≤s<t≤k
(yjt − yjs). (4.4)
Now from Cases 1 and 2, we can deduce by (4.4) that (4.3) holds for all k+1 integers
j1, . . . , jk+1 with 1 ≤ j1 < · · · < jk+1 ≤ q − l + 1 if and only if for all integers j1, . . . , jk
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with 1 ≤ j1 < · · · < jk ≤ q − l, one has
ck−1(fj(x)) +
k∏
i=1
(aj − yji)−1 6= 0,
which is equivalent to
ck−1(fj(x))
k∏
i=1
(aj − yji) + e 6= 0. (4.5)
Since fj(x) = (x − aj)q−2, the binomial theorem gives us that
ck−1(fj(x)) =
(
q − 2
k − 1
)
(−aj)q−k−1.
Then one derives that (4.5) holds for all integers j1, . . . , jk with 1 ≤ j1 < · · · < jk ≤ q− l
if and only if the following is true:(
q − 2
k − 1
)
(−aj)q−k−1
k∏
i=1
(aj − yji) + e 6= 0, (4.6)
or equivalently, (
q − 2
k − 1
)
aq−k−1j
k∏
i=1
(yji − aj) + e 6= 0 (4.7)
since q is odd. In other words, f¯j = (fj(D), ck−1(fj(x))) is a deep hole of the generalized
projective Reed-Solomon code GPRSq(D, k) if and only if the sum(
q − 2
k − 1
)
aq−1−kj
∏
y∈I
(y − aj) + e
is nonzero for any subset I ⊆ D with #(I) = k. Hence the desired result follows
immediately. The first part is proved.
Now we show the second part. Let k ≡ 0 (mod p). Then by Lemma 2.9, we have(
q−2
k−1
) ≡ 0 (mod p). So one can write (q−2
k−1
)
= p∆ with ∆ being a positive integer. Then
ck−1(fj(x)) =
(
q − 2
k − 1
)
(−aj)q−k−1 = p∆(−aj)q−k−1 = 0.
It then follows that (
q − 2
k − 1
)
aq−1−kj
∏
y∈I
(y − aj) + e = e 6= 0
for any subset I ⊆ D with #(I) = k. So it follows from the first part that the received
codeword (uj(D), ck−1(uj(x))) is a deep hole of GPRSq(D, k) if k ≡ 0 (mod p). The
second part is proved.
The proof of Theorem 1.5 is complete. ✷
We can now present the proof of Theorem 1.7 as the conclusion of this paper.
Proof of Theorem 1.7. Letting l = 1 and a1 = 0 gives us that D = F
∗
q .
If p|k, then by Theorem 1.5, one knows that the received word (u(F∗q), δ) is a deep
hole of the primitive projective Reed-Solomon code PPRSq(F
∗
q , k).
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If p ∤ k, then it follows from a1 = 0 that(
q − 2
k − 1
)
aq−1−kj
∏
y∈I
(y − aj) + e = 0 ·
(
q − 2
k − 1
)∏
y∈I
(y − aj) + e = e 6= 0
for any subset I ⊆ D with #(I) = k. Hence (u(F∗q), δ) is a deep hole of PPRSq(F∗q , k).
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.7. ✷
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